| Rajiv
Gandhi’s defeat in 1989 inaugurated the coalition
era in Indian politics. Will Rahul complete the
circle, and shut the gates on multi-party coalitions
forever?
How does one bridge a 25-year gap? Can Rahul
Gandhi’s victory in the election of 2009 be
compared with his father Rajiv’s colossal
triumph of 1984? Both events triggered a surge of
media reportage on a new generation taking charge
of India’s destiny, of a cleaner, more efficient
political culture that would do away with the shibboleths
of the old.
Yet,
it must be said the sense of hope and optimism is
measured this time. There is none of the wild euphoria
that accompanied the Rajiv mandate of December 1984
and gave the Congress over 400 seats in a Lok Sabha
of 543. Perhaps India has grown up, become cautious
or even cynical.
The circumstances are different. In 1984 India was
still, in so many ways, a closed, insecure society.
A prime minister had just been assassinated; the
year itself had seen political and social turmoil
— insurgency in Punjab, violence in Assam,
democratically-elected governments subverted in
Srinagar and Hyderabad. The mood was bitter, nasty
and sombre. India clung to its New Prince as if
he were a talisman.
When Rajiv told the Congress centenary conference
in Mumbai in December 1985 that he was committed
to ridding the party, and Indian politics, of “power
brokers”, India believed him, or wanted to.
It was a different age — when the magisterial
sway, the command of a single supreme individual
could move a whole nation and change its future.
In a sense, Rajiv had it easy. He came to power
on the crest of an emotional frenzy, discovering
India — through a series of visits to the
interiors — only after becoming prime minister.
Expectations were crazily high. When the first signs
of failure and fallibility came, his political instincts
were just not sharp enough to cope. The edifice
crashed in three years.
Rahul
has come up the harder way. When he formally entered
politics — standing for election in 2004 —
the Congress was on the ropes, not favoured to win.
It came to power fortuitously that year as an overconfident
BJP paid for poor state alliances. The Congress-led
UPA government was precarious, dependent on the
support and vulnerable to the blackmail of robber-baron
regional allies and an obstinate, cussed Left.
Rahul didn’t join the government, didn’t
take on a high-profile job. He put his head down
and got to work. He travelled to the rural backwaters
of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, Assam and Maharashtra,
and far beyond. Wherever he went, he met poor rural
folk, ordinary small-town college students, down-at-heel
citizens.
Not everybody saw the virtues. Many dismissed it
as naïve politics or as a quest for photo-ops.
In retrospect, it must be recognised that Rahul
was only seeking to rediscover the framework of
old-fashioned politics. He was going to the people,
to claim them as his own. His branding was perfect
— a man comfortable with the masses and not
devoted to the high life or to business conferences.
In a sense, the election of 2009 was Rahul’s
teaser-trailer. In Uttar Pradesh, he established
that a fatigue factor had set in with the prevalent
political actors and voters were happy to give him,
and his Congress, a chance. In doing so, they were
willing to break strict caste-based barriers that
had dominated the state’s polity for two decades.
In Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh, among
other states, he experimented with younger candidates,
taking a risk that he felt was necessary for the
long term. In many cases it paid off. In Mandsaur
(Madya Pradesh), Meenakshi Natarajan, an earnest
35-year-old, born to a business executive originally
from Tamil Nadu, defeated a BJP veteran who had
served several terms.
In Tamil Nadu itself, the formidable Vaiko was defeated
by Manik Tagore, a neophyte and son of a
school-teacher, who spoke
soberly, made no references to the Tamil Tigers
and had no legacy to boast of or carry around as
baggage.
Admittedly, Natarajan and Tagore are exceptions.
So many others of the Congress’ “Rahul
generation” are simply sons and daughters
of political parents and have had that head-start.
Yet, grant Rahul this, he has made an attempt to
change things. He has also learnt his politics bottom-up.
His apprenticeship has been a longer and deeper
one than his father’s. It will, presumably,
allow him to take the knocks with greater equanimity
than was Rajiv’s experience.
Rahul the politician has established his credentials
but how much do we know about Rahul the individual
and Rahul the policy-maker? That final identity
is particularly important because while he has given
the impression of being a diligent learner over
the past three odd years, the fact is his party
is already seeing him as a potential prime minister
in the next three odd years.
In this period he will be expected to speak his
mind on foreign policy, internal security, big-ticket
structural changes in the economy. Thus far he has
limited his public views to welfare, to rural development,
to income redistribution, setting up an effective
dole system and working with NGOs and civil society
institutions.
Politically,
this places him left-of-centre, but only just. The
appropriation of development agencies and NGO activists
by the Congress, as a means to build an alternative
political cadre almost, is a strategy that Rahul
has readily embraced.
However, this is also a man who carefully, even
silently, backed the India-United States nuclear
agreement, arguably the most dramatic rightwing
swerve in the history of Indian diplomacy. He
has spoken loosely of the need for economic reform
as only growth can generate the surplus that will
be necessary for welfarism. Nevertheless, he has
been vague on the details. India may have decided
it likes Rahul Gandhi, but it still doesn’t
know him enough.
Rahul, however, is working to a definite plan. As
senior leader Pranab Mukherjee told a television
channel just after the May 16 verdict, the party
dreams of contesting all 543 seats in the 2014 Lok
Sabha election.
Its individual success in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh
— fallow areas for decades — has given
the Congress courage. Already, there is talk of
breaking the state-level alliance with the Nationalist
Congress Party (NCP) and going it alone in Maharashtra’s
Assembly elections in October 2009.
That will be the next test for the Rahul doctrine.
His father’s defeat in 1989 inaugurated the
coalition era in Indian politics. Will the son complete
the circle, and shut the gates on multi-party coalitions
forever? At some point between now and 2014, Rahul
Gandhi will find out. So will the rest of India.

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